Calculating Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations by Nathanson, Charles Gordon et al.
 
Calculating Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations
 
 
(Article begins on next page)
The Harvard community has made this article openly available.
Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Citation Nathanson Charles G., Corina E. Tarnita, and Martin A. Nowak.
2009. Calculating evolutionary dynamics in structured
populations. PLoS Computational Biology 5(12): e1000615.
Published Version doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615
Accessed February 18, 2015 10:31:44 AM EST
Citable Link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3892593
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University's DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at
http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAACalculating Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured
Populations
Charles G. Nathanson
1., Corina E. Tarnita
2.*, Martin A. Nowak
2
1Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America, 2Program for Evolutionary Dynamics, Department of Mathematics,
Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, United States of America
Abstract
Evolution is shaping the world around us. At the core of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing
individuals. The outcome of an evolutionary process depends on population structure. Here we provide a general formula
for calculating evolutionary dynamics in a wide class of structured populations. This class includes the recently introduced
‘‘games in phenotype space’’ and ‘‘evolutionary set theory.’’ There can be local interactions for determining the relative
fitness of individuals, but we require global updating, which means all individuals compete uniformly for reproduction. We
study the competition of two strategies in the context of an evolutionary game and determine which strategy is favored in
the limit of weak selection. We derive an intuitive formula for the structure coefficient, s, and provide a method for efficient
numerical calculation.
Citation: Nathanson CG, Tarnita CE, Nowak MA (2009) Calculating Evolutionary Dynamics in Structured Populations. PLoS Comput Biol 5(12): e1000615.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615
Editor: Carl T. Bergstrom, University of Washington, United States of America
Received August 12, 2009; Accepted November 16, 2009; Published December 18, 2009
Copyright:  2009 Nathanson et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: This work was supported by the John Templeton Foundation, the NSF/NIH joint program in mathematical biology (NIH grant R01GM078986), the Bill
and Melinda Gates Foundation (Grand Challenges grant 37874) and Jeffrey Epstein. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision
to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: corina@math.harvard.edu
. These authors contributed equally to this work.
Introduction
Constant selection implies that the fitness of individuals does not
depend on the composition of the population. In general, however,
the success of individuals is affected by what others are doing.
Then we are in the realm of game theory [1–3] or evolutionary
game theory [4–8]. The latter is the study of frequency dependent
selection; the fitness of individuals is typically assumed to be a
linear function of the frequencies of strategies (or phenotypes) in
the population. The population is trying to adapt on a dynamic
fitness landscape; the changes in the fitness landscape are caused
by the population that moves over it [9]. There is also a close
relationship between evolutionary game theory and ecology [10]:
the success of a species in an ecosystem depends on its own
abundance and the abundance of other species.
The classical approach to evolutionary game dynamics is based
on deterministic differential equations describing infinitely large,
well-mixed populations [6,11]. In a well-mixed population any two
individuals interact equally likely. Some recent approaches
consider stochastic evolutionary dynamics in populations of finite
size [12,13]. Evolutionary game dynamics are also affected by
population structure [14–22]. For example, a well-mixed popula-
tion typically opposes evolution of cooperation, while a structured
population can promote it. There is also a long standing tradition
of studying spatial models in ecology [23–25], population genetics
[26,27] and inclusive fitness theory [28–30].
Evolutionary graph theory is an extension of spatial games,
which are normally studied on regular lattices, to general graphs
[31–34]. The graph determines who meets whom and reflects
physical structure or social networks. The payoff of individuals is
derived from local interactions with their neighbors on the graph.
Moreover, individuals compete locally with their neighbors for
reproduction. These two processes can also be described by
separate graphs [35].
‘Games in phenotype space’ [36] represent another type of
spatial model for evolutionary dynamics, which is motivated by the
idea of tag based cooperation [37–39]. In addition to behavioral
strategies, individuals express other phenotypic features which
serve as markers of identification. In one version of the model,
individuals interact only with those who carry the same phenotypic
marker. This approach can lead to a clustering in phenotype
space, which can promote evolution of cooperation [36].
‘Evolutionary set theory’ represents another type of spatial model
[40].Each individualcanbelongto severalsets.Ata particular time,
some sets have many members, while others are empty. Individuals
interact with others in the same set and thereby derive a payoff.
Individuals update their set memberships and strategies by global
comparison with others. Successful strategies spawn imitators, and
successful sets attract more members. Therefore, the population
structure is described by an ever changing, dynamical graph.
Evolutionary dynamics in set structured populations can favor
cooperators over defectors.
In all three frameworks – evolutionary graph theory, games in
phenotype space and evolutionary set theory – the fitness of
individuals is a consequence of local interactions. In evolutionary
graph theory there is also a local update rule: individuals learn
from their neighbors on the graph or compete with nearby
individuals for placing offspring. For evolutionary set theory,
however, [40] assumes global updating: individuals can learn from
all others in the population and adopt their strategies and set
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games in phenotype space [36]. The approach that is presented in
this paper requires global updating. Therefore, our result holds for
evolutionary set theory and for games in phenotype space, but
does not apply to evolutionary graph theory.
Results
Consider a game between two strategies, A and B. If two A
players interact, both get payoff a;i fA interacts with B, then A
gets b and B gets c; if two B players interact, both get d. These
interactions are represented by the payoff matrix
AB
A
B
ab
cd
 !
ð1Þ
We consider a population of finite size N. Each individual uses
either strategy A or B. In the framework that we investigate here,
the population structure specifies how people interact to derive
their payoff. It could be that some individuals interact while others
do not, or that some individuals interact stronger or more
frequently than others. For example, in evolutionary set theory
individuals interact with others who are in the same set and two
individuals interact as many times as they have sets in common; in
games in phenotype space, individuals interact with others who
share the same phenotype.
Based on these interactions, individuals derive a cumulative
payoff, p. The fitness of an individual is given by 1zwp where the
parameter w characterizes the intensity of selection. In this paper
we consider the limit of weak selection, w?0.
Reproduction is proportional to fitness but subject to mutation.
With probability 1{u the offspring adopts the strategy of the
parent. With probability u a random strategy is chosen (which is
either A or B).
A state of the population contains all information that can affect
the payoffs of players. It assigns to each player a strategy (A or B)
and a ‘location’ (in space, phenotype space etc). Thus, one can
think of a state as a binary vector which specifies the strategy of
each individual, together with a real N|N matrix whose ij-th
entry specifies the weight of the interaction of individual i with j.
For example, in evolutionary set theory, the ij-th entry of this
matrix gives the number of sets i and j have in common [40]. Note
that this matrix is not necessarily symmetric: the weight of i’s
interaction with j might be different from the weight of j’s
interaction with i. In this paper, whenever we refer to the number
of interactions between individuals, we always count them with
their weights or multiplicities.
For our proof we assume a finite state space and we study the
Markov process defined by gameplay together with the update rule
on this state space. The Markov process has a unique stationary
distribution defined over all states.
It is shown in [41] that for weak selection, the condition that A
is more abundant than B in the stationary distribution of the
mutation-selection process described above can be written as
sazbwczsd: ð2Þ
Therefore, the crucial condition specifying which strategy is more
abundant is a linear inequality in the payoff values, a,b,c,d. The
structure coefficient, s, can depend on the population structure,
the update rule, the population size and the mutation rate, but not
on the payoff values, a,b,c and d. This ‘structural dominance’
condition (2) holds for a wide variety of population structures and
update rules, including games in well mixed populations [12,13],
games on graphs [32–34], games in phenotype space [36] and
games in set structured populations [40].
For a large well-mixed population we obtain s~1. Therefore,
the standard risk-dominance type condition, azbwczd, specifies
if A is more abundant than B. Spatial structure leads to s values
that are greater than 1. The larger s the greater is the deviation
from the well mixed population. For very large s strategy A is
more abundant than B if awd. Therefore, spatial structure
promotes Pareto efficiency over risk dominance [41]. If a spatial
model generates sw1 then it is a mechanism for the evolution of
cooperation [42].
Here we derive a formula for s that holds for all processes
satisfying two conditions:
(i) global updating, which means individuals compete uniformly
with all others for reproduction and
(ii) constant birth or death rate which means the payoff from the
game can affect either the birth rate or the death rate but not
both.
These assumptions are fulfilled, for example, by games in
phenotype space [36] and by games on sets [40]. They do not
hold, however, for games on graphs [32]. The first assumption is
necessary because our calculation requires that the update rule
depends only on fitness, and not on locality. Local update rules are
less well-behaved and can even lead to negative values of s. The
second assumption insures that the change in the frequency of
players is due only to a change in selection. Without this second
assumption the conditions would be more complicated.
For each state of the system, let NA be the number of individuals
using strategy A; the number of individuals using strategy B is
NB~N{NA. Furthermore, let IAA denote the total number of
encounters that A individuals have with other A individuals. Note
that every AA pair is counted twice because each A individual in
the pair has an encounter with another A individual. As specified
before, whenever we say ‘number of interactions’ we count the
interactions together with their weights (if such weights occur in
the model). Let IAB denote the total number of interactions that an
A individual has with B individuals. Our main result is that the
structure coefficient, s, can be written as
ð3Þ
The notation S:T0 means that the quantity is averaged over all
states of the stochastic process under neutral drift, w~0; each term
of the average is weighted by the frequency of the corresponding
state in the stationary distribution. Intuitively, s captures how
much more likely it is, on average, for an individual to play with
Author Summary
At the center of any evolutionary process is a population
of reproducing individuals. The structure of this population
can greatly affect the outcome of evolution. If the fitness
of an individual is determined by its interactions with
others, then we are in the world of evolutionary game
theory. The population structure specifies who interacts
with whom. We derive a simple formula that holds for a
wide class of such evolutionary processes. This formula
provides an efficient computational method for studying
evolutionary dynamics in structured populations.
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 his own kind rather than with the other kind. An illustration of this
formula is shown in Figure 1.
This formula suggests a simple numerical algorithm for
calculating the s-factor for any spatial process with global
updating. We let the process run for a very long time assuming
that all individuals have the same fitness. Thus, we simulate
mutation and neutral drift on a spatial structure. For each state we
evaluate NB, IAA, and IAB. We add up all IAANB terms to get the
numerator in eq (3). We add up all IABNB terms to get the
denominator. The resulting s can be used for any game given by
the payoff matrix (1) to determine if strategy A is more frequent
than strategy B in the limit of weak selection.
The rigorous proof of eq (3) is given in Appendix A; here we
provide an intuition for it. For symmetry reasons, at neutrality, we
have the following identities SIAANBT0~SIBBNAT0 and
SIABNBT0~SIBANAT0. Using these symmetries together with
our formula (3), we rewrite condition (2) as
aSIAANBT0zbSIABNBT0wcSIBANAT0zdSIBBNAT0: ð4Þ
Denoting by HXY~IXY=NX the average number of interactions
of X individuals with Y individuals, we can further rewrite eq. (4)
as
SxA(1{xA)(pA{pB)T0w0: ð5Þ
Here xA is the frequency of A individuals, pA is the average payoff
of an A-individual and pB is the average payoff of a B-individual.
These are pA~aHAAzbHAB and pB~cHBAzdHBB.
A standard replicator equation for deterministic evolutionary
game dynamics of two strategies in a well-mixed population can
be written as _ x xA~wxA(1{xA)(pA{pB) where _ x xA is the time
derivative of the change due to selection and pA~axAzb(1{xA)
and pB~cxAzd(1{xA) denote the average payoffs for A and B
if the frequency of A is xA. This equation describes how selection
alone changes the frequency of strategy A over time. Hence, the
condition that strategy A is favored by selection is S_ x xATw0 where
the average is now taken over all states of the mutation-selection
process, in the presence of game (w=0). In the limit of weak
selection, one can write the first-order Taylor expansion of this
inequality to obtain S_ x xAT~S_ x xAT0zwS L
Lw_ x xAT0w0. Since at
neutrality the average change in the frequency of A is zero, our
condition for strategy A to be favored over strategy B becomes
S L
Lw_ x xAT0w0 which is precisely inequality (5). Therefore inequality
(5) has a very intuitive interpretation.
Evolution of cooperation
As a particular game we can study the evolution of cooperation.
Consider the simplified Prisoner’s Dilemma payoff matrix:
CD
C
D
b{c {c
b 0
 !
ð6Þ
This means cooperators, C, pay a cost c for others to receive a
benefit, b. Defectors, D, pay no cost and distribute no benefits.
The game is a Prisoner’s Dilemma if bwcw0.
As shown in [41], if we use equation (2) we can always write the
critical benefit-to-cost ratio as
b
c
    
~
sz1
s{1
ð7Þ
provided sw1. If the benefit-to-cost ratio exceeds this critical
value, then cooperators are more abundant than defectors in the
mutation-selection equilibrium of the stochastic process for weak
selection. A higher s corresponds to a lower benefit-to-cost ratio
and is thus better for the evolution of cooperation.
From eqs (3) and (7) we can write
b
c
    
~
S(ICCzICD)NDT0
S(ICC{ICD)NDT0
: ð8Þ
This formula is very useful for finding the critical benefit-to-cost
ratio numerically. Moreover, we can rewrite the critical benefit-to-
cost ratio in terms of average number of interactions rather than
total number of interactions as
b
c
    
~
SxC(1{xC)(HCCzHCD)T0
SxC(1{xC)(HCC{HCD)T0
: ð9Þ
These equations provide intuitive formulations of the critical
benefit-to-cost ratio for processes with global updating.
Computational example: Evolutionary dynamics on sets
Our new formula for s (eq. 3) gives a simple numerical
algorithm for calculating this quantity in any spatial process with
global updating and constant birth or death rate. We simulate this
Figure 1. Calculation of s for a very simple example with
population size N~ ~3. Suppose there is a ‘spatial’ process which has
two mixed states. These two states must have the same frequency in
the stationary distribution at neutrality, because the process cannot
introduce asymmetries between A and B at neutrality. Each mixed state
can be described by a weighted, directed graph: in a state with iA
players, let pi be the probability that an A plays with another A and let
qi be the probability that an A plays with a B. These probabilities are
enough since for the calculation of s we only need the AA edges and
the AB edges. Note also that the pure states, all-A and all-B, do not
contribute to the calculation. We obtain s~p2=(2q1zq2).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615.g001
Calculating Evol Dynamics in Structured Population
PLoS Computational Biology | www.ploscompbiol.org 3 December 2009 | Volume 5 | Issue 12 | e1000615process under neutral drift for many generations. For each state we
evaluate NB, IAA, and IAB. We add up all NBIAA products to get
the numerator in eq (3), and then we add up all NBIAB products to
get the denominator. The resulting s can be used for any game
given by the payoff matrix (1) to determine if strategy A is more
frequent than strategy B in the limit of weak selection.
In this section we use the simple numerical algorithm suggested
by our formula (3) to find s for evolutionary dynamics on sets [40].
In that paper, the authors compute an exact analytic formula for s
that depends on the parameters of their model. We compare our
simulated estimates for s with their theoretical values and find
perfect agreement (Figure 2). Furthermore, we use our computa-
tional method to calculate s in an extension of the original model.
An analytic solution for this extended model has not yet been
found. Thus our simulated estimates constitute the first ‘‘solution’’
of this extended model (Figure 3).
The original set-structured model describes a population of N
individuals distributed over M sets. Individuals interact with
others who belong to the same set. Two individuals interact as
many times as they have sets in common, and these interactions
lead to payoffs from a game as described in general in Section 2.
Reproductive updating follows a Wright-Fisher process, where N
individuals are selected with replacement to seed the next
generation. The more fit an individual, the more likely it is to
be chosen as a parent. An offspring adopts the parent’s strategy
with probability 1{u, as described in Section 2. The offspring
adopts the parent’s set memberships, but this inheritance is also
subject to mutation; with probability v, an offspring adopts a
random list of set memberships. This updating process can be
thought of as imitation-based dynamics where both strategies and
set memberships are subject to selection [40].
To obtain exact analytical calculations, it is assumed that each
individual belongs to exactly KƒM sets. In Figure 2, we pick
values for N,M,K, and u and plot s as a function of the set
mutation rate, v. The continuous curves are based on the analytic
formula for s derived in [40]. The new numerical algorithm
generates the data points. There is perfect agreement between
these two methods.
In Figure 3, we consider a variant of this model. Instead of
belonging to exactly K sets, individuals now belong to at most K
sets. With probability v, an offspring adopts a random list of at most
K memberships, the length of which is uniformly random. So far
there exists no analytical solution for this model but we can use eq.
Figure 2. Agreement of simulations with analytic results. We
test our simulation procedure against the analytic results of the set
model of [40]. Parameters used are N~100 and M~10. K~1,2 or 3 is
the number of sets an individual is in, u is the strategy mutation, and v is
the set mutation. We run simulations for 107 generations. We use a low
strategy mutation (u~0:2) in (A) and a high strategy mutation
(u~0:002) in (B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615.g002
Figure 3. Simulated results for model with variable number of
set memberships. An individual can be in 1, 2, or 3 sets; when he
mutates set membership, the number of sets he joins is drawn with
uniform probability. Parameter values are N~100, M~10; u is the
strategy mutation rate and v is the set mutation rate. We run the
simulation using the method of eq. (3) for 107 generations. Dots
indicate simulated results, which are interpolated with a smooth curve.
This variable set membership model has not yet been solved
analytically. (A) The interpolated curve for small strategy mutation
(u~0:002) compared to the analytical result for K~1,2 or 3. (B) The
interpolated curve for high strategy mutation rate (u~0:2) compared
to the analytical result for K~1,2 or 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000615.g003
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with smooth curves. We observe that for low mutation, Fig. 3(A),
the case Kƒ3 gives a s which is smaller than the K~3 case.
Hence, for low mutation, allowing people to be in at most K sets
turns out to be worse for cooperation than restricting them to be in
exactly K sets. However, for high strategy mutation, Fig. 3(B), the s
for Kƒ3 is greater than the one for K~3. Hence, for high
strategy mutation, allowing individuals to be in at most K sets seems
to be better for cooperation than restricting them to be in exactly K
sets. This suggests that there exists an intermediate strategy
mutation rate where the two cases are similar.
Discussion
It has been shown that evolutionary dynamics in a structured
population can be described by a single parameter, s, if we are
merely interested in the question, which of the two competing
strategies, A or B, is more abundant in the limit of weak selection
[41]. Payoff matrix (1) describes the interaction between the two
strategies A and B and the inequality sazbwczsd specifies that
A is more abundant than B in the mutation-selection equilibrium.
In general the parameter s can depend on the population
structure (which specifies who interacts with whom for accumu-
lating payoff and for evolutionary updating), the population size
and the mutation rates; but it does not depend on the entries of the
payoff matrix. The s parameter has been explicitly calculated for a
number of models including games on graphs, games in phenotype
space, games in set structured populations and a simple model of
multi-level selection [42].
Here we provide a general formula for the s factor, which holds
for the case of global updating. Global updating means that all
members of the population compete globally (as opposed to
locally) for reproduction. For example, global updating arises in
the following way: one individual reproduces and another random
individual dies (in order to maintain constant population size); the
offspring of the first individual might inherit (up to mutation) the
strategy and the ‘location’ of the parent. Global updating is a
feature of models for games in phenotype space [36] and for games
on sets [40].
Our main result, eq (3), provides both an intuitive description of
what the s factor is and an efficient way for numerical
computation.
Materials and Methods
Here we give the proof of equation (3). It is based on the
following three claims which we prove in the next subsection:
Claim 1. First, we show that for structures and update rules
with either constant death rate or constant birth rate the condition
SxATw
1
2
ð10Þ
for strategy A to be favored over strategy B is equivalent to
SbirthA{deathATw0 ð11Þ
where birthA and deathA are the total birth and death rates of A
players and SbirthA{deathAT~
P
S (birthA{deathA)SpS is the
change due to selection averaged over all states of the system,
weighted by the probability pS that the system is in each state. The
change due to selection in the frequency of A in each state is
the difference between the number of A’s that are born and the
number of A’s that die.
Claim 2. We show that for global updating, condition (11) is
equivalent to
S
L
Lw
       
w~0
(birthA{deathA)T0w0: ð12Þ
Here S:T0 denotes the average over the stationary distribution in
the neutral process, w~0.
Claim 3. Finally we claim that, in the limit of weak selection,
for structures satisfying global updating and constant death or
birth, the difference between the birth rate and death rate of an
individual i in state S can be written in terms of the payoff of
individual i as:
birthi{deathi!w(pi{ptot=N) ð13Þ
where ptot is the total payoff of players in the given state S.
Combining the three claims, we conclude that condition (10) is
equivalent to
Sptot
A {xAptotT0w0: ð14Þ
Using the weighted number of interactions between players, we
can rewrite the total payoffs in any given state as
ptot
A ~aIAAzbIAB
ptot~aIAAzbIABzcIBAzdIBB
Thus, condition (14) is equivalent to
aSIAA(1{xA)T0zbSIAB(1{xA)T0wcSIBAxAT0zdSIBBxAT0: ð16Þ
However, since 1{xA~xB, by symmetry at neutrality we have
that SIAAxBT0~SIBBxAT0 and SIABxBT0~SIBAxAT0. Hence
(16) is equivalent to
sazbwczsd ð17Þ
where
s~
SxBIAAT0
SxBIABT0
: ð18Þ
This concludes the proof of the main result. Below we give the
proofs for the three claims made above.
Proofs of Claims
Proof of Claim 1. By assumption, either birth or death has a
fixed rate; assume without loss of generality that death is constant
with rate d. In a given state, the expected change in the frequency
of A individuals is
DxA~ 1{
u
2
  
birthAz
u
2
birthB{deathA: ð19Þ
We simplify this equation using the following three relations:
birthAzbirthB~deathAzdeathB since the population size is
fixed; deathA~dxA and deathB~dxB since the death rate is
constant and, finally xB~1{xA. Moreover, we know that on
average selection and mutation balance each other, so the average
Calculating Evol Dynamics in Structured Population
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SDxAT~0. Using all these into (19) we conclude that
SxAT~
1
2
z
1{u
ud
SbirthA{deathAT: ð20Þ
This proves the claim. Note that this claim holds for any intensity
of selection.
Proof of Claim 2. As in [41], we are assuming that the
transition probabilities are differentiable functions of w at w~0.
Then, in the limit of weak selection, we can write the first-order
Taylor expansion of SbirthA{deathAT at w~0
SbirthA{deathAT~SbirthA{deathAT0z
w
L
Lw
       
w~0
SbirthA{deathAT:
ð21Þ
For global updating, the average change due to selection in the
neutral process is zero, i.e. SbirthA{deathAT0~0. Moreover,
using the product rule, we write:
L
Lw
       
w~0
SbirthA{deathAT~
X
S
(birthA{deathA)Sjw~0
LpS
Lw
       
w~0
z
z
X
S
pSjw~0
L(birthA{deathA)S
Lw
       
w~0
~
~
L birthA{deathA ðÞ
Lw
       
w~0 0
:
ð22Þ
Here we used the fact that for neutrality, under global updating in
a fixed population size, individuals have equal birth and death
rates; hence, (birthA{deathA)Sjw~0~0 for all states S. This gives
the desired result.
Proof of Claim 3. Again, we assume without loss of
generality that the death rate is constant, equal to d.I n
neutrality, all individuals have effective payoff 1. As noted in the
proof of Claim 2, an individual has equal birth and death rates at
neutrality, w~0. Thus, in the limit of weak selection, we can write
the first-order Taylor expansion at w~0 and obtain
birthi~dzw
Lbirthi
Lw
       
w~0
: ð23Þ
When w=0, the birth rate of each individual depends on the
effective payoff of any other individual, which itself is a function of
w: fj~1zwpj. Hence (23) can be rewritten using the chain rule as
birthi~dzw
X
j
Lbirthi
Lfj
       
w~0
pj: ð24Þ
Because the population size is fixed, we have P
i birthi~
P
i deathi~d. Hence, summing (24) we obtain
X
i,j
Lbirthi
Lfj
       
w~0
pj~0: ð25Þ
When w~0 all individuals have the same fitness. Therefore,
by the symmetry imposed by global updating, we have:
Lbirthi=Lfijw~0~Lbirthj=Lfjjw~0 for all i and j and
Lbirthi=Lfjjw~0~Lbirthk=Lfljw~0 for all i=j and k=l. It thus
follows from (25) that for each j=i
Lbirthi
Lfi
       
w~0
~{(N{1)
Lbirthi
Lfj
       
w~0
: ð26Þ
Thus, we can rewrite (24) as
birthi~dzw
N
N{1
Lbirthi
Lfi
       
w~0
(pi{
1
N
X
j
pj)
which gives the desired result.
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